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Since its genesis, criticism of the doctrine of diminished responsibility has been extensive,both in respect of its underlying principles and practical effects. It has been called all
sorts of names: “elliptical almost to the point of nonsense”,1 inaccurate2 and essentially
illogical.3 Yet, in 2006, the Irish legislature deemed it appropriate to incorporate the partial
defence into Irish law. To attempt to ascertain why, this paper reflects upon the
development of the doctrine throughout the jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, and
tracks its gradual progress to the republic under s. 6 of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act
2006. With the doctrine now firmly enshrined in Irish law, the paper moves to consider the
underlying rationale peculiar to s. 6, in addition to the early signs of its impact in practice.
The first part of this paper charts chronologically the fluctuating nature and scope of the
doctrine in the jurisdictions discussed, showing the malleable margins pertaining to the
defence in practice. It shows how the language used to define the doctrine, and its
interpretation, are shaped not so much by academic agreement on how the wording should
be understood, but on political and social issues of the time. Consideration is afforded to the
foundational nature of the doctrine in Scotland in order to arrive at an understanding of its
original intention. The impact of its mid-twentieth-century migration to the statute books of
England and Wales, and later Northern Ireland, is then discussed as this marks an important
shift in the status and interpretation of the doctrine. Following this, the ascent of the doctrine
into Irish law is considered, in conjunction with more recent statutory developments affecting
this area of law in England and Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland.
The second part discusses in greater depth the nature and scope of the law in Ireland,
in particular, its relationship with the insanity defence and its role as a means of mitigating
the harsh effect of the mandatory life sentence for murder. Recent Irish caselaw is also
taken into account, with a view to identifying the emergence of patterns in the
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1 E Griew, “Reducing murder to manslaughter: whose job?” (1986) 12 J Med E 18. Griew’s criticism was in the
context of the definition under s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957.
2 G H Gordon, Criminal Law of Scotland 3rd edn (Edinburgh: Green 2000), p. 451.
3 B Wootton, “Diminished responsibility: a layman’s view” (1960) 76 LQR 224, p. 236.
interpretation of the law since its introduction in 2006. The options available to the courts
at the disposal stage are shown to be lacking and the approach of the judiciary inconsistent.
1 Historical reflections
1.1 SCOTLAND: ORIGINS TO MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY
That the doctrine was initially applied to both capital and non-capital charges4 suggests that
at its core is a larger ideal, a more general expression of “tenderness to the frailty of human
nature”.5 A pragmatic statement of the concept is evidenced as early as the late seventeenth
century in Scotland,6 with an attitude in stark contrast to its neighbouring jurisdiction.7 Its
incarnation in caselaw has been identified as early as 1704,8 and by the nineteenth century,
the notion of diminished responsibility was established within the Scots law as a form of
mitigatory plea, albeit somewhat informally.9
Flexibility was the order of the day in Scotland, but as the nineteenth century
progressed, and with it the legal system, the doctrine took on a more structured
countenance.10 Judges began to take the initiative by directing juries to provide
recommendations as to mercy, as opposed to leaving judges to arrive at such a decision of
their own accord.11 Following this, it was not long before the verdict of murder with a
recommendation to mercy was dispensed with altogether in this context in favour of the
more potent verdict of culpable homicide.12 This development marked a shift in disposal
power from the Crown to the court, as there was no possibility that such a verdict could be
rejected by the Crown, the significance being that it became the role of the judge to decide
upon a suitable sentence in light of an accused’s mental state.13
Diminished responsibility as a flexible yet structured legal concept is epitomised in the
landmark case of HM Advocate v Dingwall,14 where Lord Deas referred to culpable homicide
as including “murder with extenuating circumstances”. In a series of further decisions, the
notion that various types of “mental weakness” could have the effect of reducing what
would otherwise be a conviction of murder to one of culpable homicide became
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4 In respect of non-capital charges the court would grant a reduced sentence in light of the accused’s mental
disorder, see William Braid (1835) 1 Hume Com, ch. I; Thomas Henderson (1835) (Bell’s Notes 5); and James
Ainslie (1842) 1 Broun 25. For capital cases, mental disorder was taken into account only by way of the Royal
Prerogative of Mercy, for example, see Archd Robertson (1836) 1 Swin 15.
5 Commonwealth v Webster (1850) 5 Cush 296.
6 Sir George Mackenzie, The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal, vol. 1, 1–8 (1678): “It may be
argued, that since the Law grants a total Impunity to such as are absolutely furious, that therefore it should by
the Rule of Proportions, lessen and moderat the Punishments of such, as though they are not absolutly mad,
yet are Hypocondrick and Melancholly to such a Degree, that it clouds their Reason.”
7 At around the same time in England Hale wrote that “partial insanity . . . seems not to excuse . . . in the
committing of any offence for its matter capital”: M Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown (1736). See
N Walker, Crime and Insanity in England: vol. 1, The historical perspective (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP 1968) and
J Chalmers and F Leverick, Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (Edinburgh: Green 2006), p. 221.
8 John Somerville (1704) Hume, i, 42 and 44. See Chalmers and Leverick, Criminal Defences, n. 7 above, p. 222.
9 See Gordon, Criminal Law of Scotland, n. 2 above, pp. 458–9, for further discussion of the early origins of the
doctrine.
10 The term “diminished responsibility” seems to have been first used by Lord Bell in William Braid (1835)
I Hume Com, ch. I.
11 Jas. Denny Scott (1853) 1 Irv 132.
12 John McFadyen (1860) 3 Irv 650.
13 Gordon, Criminal Law of Scotland, n. 2 above, pp. 459–60.
14 (1867) 5 Irv 466.
entrenched.15 It is noteworthy, however, that Lord Deas did not regard the accused’s weak
mental state as the sole ground for a verdict of culpable homicide on the basis of
diminished responsibility; it was rather one of a number of grounds or “elements” which
he thought might justify the decision.16
The “golden age” of flexibility was not destined to last, however, and the twentieth
century brought with it a marked shift in the attitude of the courts. There were growing
concerns that diminished responsibility was becoming a loophole for murderers. A murder
conviction resulted in hanging, and the usual outcome for a successful insanity plea at the
time was indefinite incarceration in an asylum. Thus, diminished responsibility, as an
alternative to an insanity plea, resulted in an accused evading either hanging or the asylum
– a “win-win” so to speak. Diminished responsibility was given a bad reputation as it was
seen to facilitate an escape from appropriate punishment for the accused who was not
insane and who should, in fact, have been convicted of murder.17
The approach of the courts at this time may also be attributed to the rise of
the psychiatric profession and the emphasis placed on expert evidence at trial.18
Whereas previously, a recognised mental condition or disease was not a prerequisite, now it
was moving in that direction, a move which was spurred on by the progress of
psychiatric medicine.19
Such scepticism culminated in the key decision of HM Advocate v Savage,20 where Lord
Alness set out the test for the doctrine which has since been taken as the definition of the plea:
that there must be aberration or weakness of mind; that there must be some
form of mental unsoundness; that there must be a state of mind which is
bordering on, though not amounting to, insanity; that there must be a mind so
affected that responsibility is diminished from full responsibility to partial
responsibility . . . that there must be some form of mental disease.21
A number of cases which followed supported this trend.22 Adding further to the
restrictive tendency of the law at this time was the practice of the courts of interpreting the
aforementioned set of factors so as to be collective in nature as opposed to alternatives.23
As a result, the test to establish diminished responsibility became highly restrictive and the
courts adopted the position that the scope of the plea was not to be further widened.24
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15 See John McLean (1876) 3 Coup 334.
16 For example, see Granger (1878) 4 Coup 86; Ferguson (1881) 4 Coup 552.
17 Gordon, Criminal Law of Scotland, n. 2 above, pp. 463.
18 For example, see HM Advocate v Aitken (1902) 4 Adam 88; HM Advocate v Robert Smith (1893) 1 Adam 34. For
further discussion, see Chalmers and Leverick, Criminal Defences, n. 7 above, pp. 224–5.
19 HM Advocate v Aitken (1902) 4 Adam 88 (per Lord Stormonth Darling), 94–5; HM Advocate v Higgins (1913)
7 Adam 229.
20 1923 JC 49.
21 Ibid. at 51. HM Advocate v Aitken (1902) 4 Adam 88, a particularly restrictive interpretation of the doctrine,
was the only authority quoted by Lord Alness, yet this formula has become the authoritative origin of the
modern law notwithstanding its inconsistencies with the nineteenth-century cases. See Gordon, Criminal Law
of Scotland, n. 2 above, pp. 465.
22 For example, see HM Advocate v Braithwaite 1945 JC 49, where Lord Cooper stated that “[t]here must be
something amounting or approaching to partial insanity and based on mental weakness or aberration”, at 51.
23 Connelly v HM Advocate 1990 JC 349; Williamson v HM Advocate 1994 JC 149.
24 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility No 195 (Scottish Law Commission:
Edinburgh July 2004), para. 3.2. The courts established that intoxications (Brennan v HM Advocate 1977 JC 38),
psychopathic personality disorder (HM Advocate v Carraher 1946 JC 109), or a combination of immaturity and
personality difficulty (HM Advocate v Connolly 1990 SCCR 505) would not be sufficient to establish diminished
responsibility in the absence of a specific mental illness.
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From its origins, the doctrine appears to emerge from a desire to blame and punish
those with a mental disorder, whether they be killers or not, in an appropriate and morally
justifiable manner; a doctrine which makes a concession to the weakness inherent in the
human condition. Over time, with the emergence of a more ordered legal system, a rising
psychiatric profession and a more sophisticated public, such liberal ideals – fluid in nature
– became difficult to locate within the legal system. And so diminished responsibility was
tapered to fit.
It was during this episode of narrow interpretation of the doctrine in Scotland that the
jurisdiction of England and Wales, followed shortly by Northern Ireland, decided to
incorporate diminished responsibility into legislation.
1.2 England and Wales and Northern Ireland: new beginnings
It is assumed by most that the rationale behind the introduction of diminished
responsibility in England and Wales was to assuage the restrictive nature of the insanity
defence under the M’Naghten rules.25 However, one commentator would argue that it is “a
commonly held misconception” that the doctrine was introduced for such a purpose, and
that it was instead incorporated to appease the abolitionist faction of the death penalty
debate.26 This can be supported by the fact that as early as 1883, Stephen suggested that
when madness was proved, one of three verdicts could be brought in: “Guilty; Guilty, but
his powers of self-control were diminished by insanity; Not Guilty, on the grounds of
insanity”.27 Yet the idea was not entertained again until the capital punishment debate
ignited almost a century later.
The idea of incorporating the Scottish doctrine into English law was considered, and
rejected, by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in 1953.28 Although setting out
strong arguments in favour of the doctrine of diminished responsibility, the commission
appears to have lost its nerve upon recommendation, citing its limited mandate. Its overall
conclusion was that: “the outstanding defect of the law of murder is that is provides a single
punishment for a crime widely varying in culpability.”29 The report did not receive the
acclaim it perhaps deserved and was not debated in the House of Commons for two years
following its publication.30
After a brief interlude, light was again shone on the matter by a group of Conservative
lawyers who published a pamphlet,31 inferior both in size and content when compared to
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 62(3)
25 R v McNaghten (1843) 10 Cl and F 200. See A Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP 2006) who
speaks of a “long-standing dissatisfaction” with the insanity defence, p. 277; S Prevezer, “The English
Homicide Act: a new attempt to revise the law of murder” (1957) 57(5) Columbia Law Review 624, who
considers s. 2 as an “addition to the M’Naghten rules”, p. 636. According to Ashworth, the primary criticism
of the rules is their confinement to cognitive defects and exclusion of emotional or volitional disorders from
the insanity defence (p. 207). The rules can be summarised as follows: “[T]o establish a defence on the ground
of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong” (1843) 10 Cl
and F 200, at 210.
26 F Boland, “Diminished responsibility as a defence in Irish law: past English mistakes and future Irish
directions” (1996) 6(1) ICLJ 19, p. 19; T O’Malley, Sentencing Law and Practice 2nd edn (Dublin: Thomson
Round Hall 2006), p. 408.
27 Sir J F Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (London: 1883).
28 Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949–53, Cmnd 8932 (London: HMSO 1953).
29 Ibid. para. 790.
30 HC Debs, 10 February 1955, vol. 536, cols 2064–183.
31 Sir Lionel Heald, Murder: Some suggestions for the reform of the law of murder in England (London: Inns of Court
Conservative and Unionist Society 1956).
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the Royal Commission Report.32 Though not proposing any change to the insanity defence,
it recommended that when mental abnormality did not come within the confines of the
M’Naghten rules, diminished responsibility was a useful addition to the law in this area.33
Largely due to a number of sensational cases,34 the government took heed and published a
Homicide Bill, in suppression of a Private Members’ Bill to abolish the death penalty for
murder. The following year, s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 incorporated the doctrine
into law, with the following definition:
Where a person kills or is party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted
of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising
from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent
causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental
responsibility for his acts or omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
Ironically, for those such as Boland who argue that diminished responsibility was
brought in to mitigate capital punishment and appease the abolitionists,35 the Homicide Act
abolished the capital penalty for about three-quarters of capital crime.36 Even so, the
doctrine was still limited to murder which had ceased to a significant extent to be a capital
crime at all.37 This serves to substantiate the claim that diminished responsibility in England
and Wales amounts to “a peculiar balance between a number of vectors of policy, principle
and understanding”.38
The ambiguous nature of the s. 2(1) definition was evident from the start, with one
Member of Parliament remarking that: “[t]he Clause is disappointing, because it obviously
sets out to do something that most of us want to do, but is intolerably vague and woolly”.39
This attitude found its way to the courtroom also, where judges either left the section to the
jury to interpret or described the relevant state of mind as “borderline insanity” without
further explanation.40
It was not until 1960 that the courts provided an authoritative explanation of the
definition. In R v Byrne,41 Lord Parker said that the concept of “abnormality of mind” was
considerably wider than the concept of “defect of reason” under the McNaghten Rules. He
went on to hold that the term was:
wide enough to cover the mind’s activities in all its aspects, not only the
perception of physical acts and matters, and the ability to form a rational
judgment as to whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise
will-power to control his physical acts in accordance with that rational
judgment.42
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32 S Prevezer, “The English Homicide Act”, n. 25 above, p. 630.
33 B P Block and J Hostettler, Hanging in the Balance: A history of the abolition of capital punishment in Britain
(Winchester: Waterside Press 1997).
34 For example, R v Evans [1950] 1 All ER 610; R v Ellis, The Times, London, 21 June 1955, p. 6, col. 3; R v Craig,
The Times, London, 12 December 1952, p. 2, col. 4.
35 Boland, “Diminished responsibility”, n. 26 above.
36 S Silverman, HC Debs, 28 November 1956, vol. 561, cols 433, 481–2.
37 Ibid. Suspension of the death penalty became permanent in England, Wales and Scotland in 1969 and in
Northern Ireland in 1973.
38 A Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A critical introduction to criminal law 2nd edn (London: Butterworths 2001),
p. 185.
39 A Greenwood, HC Debs, 28 November 1956, vol. 561, cols 433, 491.
40 R v Spriggs [1958] 1 QB 270; R v Walden [1959] 1 WLR 1008. For commentary on early cases, see J E Hall
Williams, “The psychopath and the defence of diminished responsibility” (1958) 21(5) MLR 544–9.
41 [1960] 2 QB 396.
42 Ibid. at 404, (per Lord Parker CJ).
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The court appears to have had very little to say about the issue of aetiology, as
represented by the bracketed words which follow it in s. 2(1).43 Criticism from the medical
profession was inevitable. For example, the phrase “abnormality of mind” was considered
obscure and inadequate from a psychiatric perspective – it is not a medical term and so its
meaning has had to develop in the courts on a case-by-case basis.44
The Byrne case, and the body of caselaw which was to follow, however, engineered such
ambiguity to its advantage so as to bring about flexibility in practice. As a result, the scope
of the definition was deemed to cover a wide range of mental conditions, including
psychopathy, volitional insanity and alcoholism.45 The defence even applied to the mercy
killer, of which Glanville Williams has remarked:
One may question whether leniency has not sometimes gone too far . . . there
can be no doubt of the beneficial effect of the defence in [such] cases. Here it is
invariably accepted by the jury on the flimsiest medical evidence, and thankfully
used by the judge as a reason for leniency.46
Turning to the situation in Northern Ireland, due to a dearth of murder cases and no
executions for murder for 20 years, there was little public demand for the law to be amended
along the lines of the 1957 Act.47 However, two controversial hangings in the 1960s which
would probably have resulted in life sentences in England and Wales brought an end to
public indifference. Initial attempts to introduce diminished responsibility together with the
abolition of the death sentence were unsuccessful;48 however, the doctrine was eventually
introduced in Northern Ireland under the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1966.49
The next significant review of the law came in 1975, with the highly publicised and well-
received Butler Report.50 The Butler Committee remarked that: “the only substantial
justification for maintaining the existing provision for a finding of diminished responsibility
appears to be the continued existence of the mandatory life sentence for murder”.51 Its
preferred solution was to abolish the mandatory life sentence for murder and with it,
diminished responsibility.52 Failing such reform, it recommended a reformulation of the
s. 2 definition.53
Soon after, the Criminal Law Revision Committee54 gave a majority view that
diminished responsibility should be retained even if flexibility in sentencing for murder
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 62(3)
43 R D Mackay, “The abnormality of mind factor in diminished responsibility” (1999) Crim LR 117, p. 117.
44 Law Commission Report, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide No 304 (Law Commission: London 2006), para.
5.111.
45 See Mackay, “Abnormality”, n. 43 above, p. 117; R v Tandy [1989] 1 All ER 267; R v Wood [2008] WLR(D) 204.
46 G Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law 2nd edn (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd 1983), p. 693. See also E Griew,
“The future of diminished responsibility” (1988) Crim LR 75, pp. 79–80.
47 W N Osborough, “Homicide and Criminal Responsibility Bill (NI) 1963” (1965) 16 NILQ 73, p. 73.
48 The Homicide and Criminal Responsibility Bill 1963 did not receive a second reading in the Northern Ireland
House of Commons.
49 S. 5 (effect, in cases of homicide, of impaired mental responsibility); s. 6 (unlawful killing while under
voluntary intoxication).
50 Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (London: HMSO 1975). See H R Rollin, “Report of the
Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders” (1976) 1(600) BMJ 48.
51 Butler Report, n. 50 above, para. 19.27.
52 Ibid. paras 19.14–16.
53 Ibid. para. 19.17: “the mental disorder was such as to be an extenuating circumstance which ought to reduce
the offence to manslaughter”.
54 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fourteenth Report: Offences against the person, Cmnd 7844 (London: HMSO
1980), paras. 92–4.
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were introduced.55 Its proposed wording eventually formed the basis of the definition of
diminished responsibility in the draft Criminal Code Bill,56 however, despite bouts of
progress, enthusiasm for codification, and indeed amendment to the law of murder,
dwindled somewhat.57 It was during this lull in England and Wales and Northern Ireland
that matters took an interesting turn in Scotland.
1.3 A RETURN TO FLEXIBILITY IN SCOTLAND
The restrictive direction that the defence had taken in Scotland was not sitting easily. In
2001 some concerns were raised by the Millan Report58 which recommended that the
Scottish Law Commission should be invited to review diminished responsibility in
conjunction with the insanity defence.59 Before the commission had the opportunity to do
so, however, the judiciary stepped in to reverse the trend with the decision in HM Advocate
v Galbraith60 which has broadened significantly the scope of the doctrine in practice. The
court in this case provided a definitive common law definition of the plea to the effect that:
“at the relevant time, the accused was suffering from an abnormality of mind which
substantially impaired the ability of the accused, as compared with a normal person, to
determine or control his acts”.61 According to the Scottish Law Commission, the decision
was welcomed on the whole in Scotland, and as such, it recommended that a new legislative
definition should do little more than re-state the Galbraith criteria.62
Prior to Galbraith, it was assumed that diminished responsibility in Scotland depended
upon a finding that the accused had a mental illness or disease, however, this is not now
necessary,63 with the result that the reach of the plea has been considerably widened.64 The
commission’s recommendations in respect of diminished responsibility were taken on
board by the Scottish Executive and implemented by the Criminal Justice and Licensing
(Scotland) Act 2010.65
It is noteworthy that the current Scots law test is very similar to the original English
test under s. 2, although, as Chalmers and Leverick have remarked, that may not be entirely
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55 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fourteenth Report, n. 54 above, paras 76 and 42. See Griew, “The future”,
n. 46 above; C Wells, “Criminal Law Revision Committee, 14th Report: Offences against the Person:
Homicide” (1980) 43(6) MLR 681, p. 688.
56 Law Commission, Report on Criminal Law: Codification of the criminal law – a report to the Law Commission, No 143.
HC270 (London: HMSO 1985).
57 Law Commission, Report on a Criminal Code for England and Wales, No 177 (London: HMSO 1989): “The present
Government has, however, made it clear . . . that it sees no reason to alter the present constituents of the law
of murder, nor indeed, to alter the mandatory life sentence for murder”, para. 1.28. The Law Commission’s
programme of simplification has overtaken its codification mandate, see Tenth Programme of Law Reform, No
311 (London: HMSO 2007), para. 2.24.
58 Millan Committee, New Directions: Report on the review of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (SE/2001/56),
ch. 29, paras 51–61.
59 Ibid. para. 29.6 (Recommendation).
60 2002 JC 1.
61 Ibid. at 21.
62 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility, SE/2004/92 (Edinburgh: Stationery
Office 2004), para. 3.4.
63 In so far as the cases of Connelly v HM Advocate (1990) SCCR 504 and Williamson v HM Advocate (1994) SCCR
358 required mental illness or mental disease as a critical element of a successful diminished responsibility
plea, they were disapproved in Galbraith, 20G, para. 52.
64 G H Gordon, Criminal Law of Scotland 3rd edn, Supp. Service (Edinburgh: Green 2005), p. 49.
65 S. 51B(1) provides that: “A person who would otherwise be convicted of murder is instead to be convicted of
culpable homicide on grounds of diminished responsibility if the person’s ability to determine or control
conduct for which the person would otherwise be convicted of murder was, at the time of the conduct,
substantially impaired by reason of abnormality of mind.”
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inappropriate given that s. 2 was drafted in order to “introduce into English law the
Scottish doctrine of diminished responsibility”.66 This implies that the current draft
definition in Scotland is merely a clarification of the law as it was intended in the first
instance. Yet, this comes at a time of further change in the definition in England and Wales
and Northern Ireland.
1.4 A SURPRISING SHIFT IN ENGLAND AND WALES AND NORTHERN IRELAND
Debate surrounding the doctrine was revived in 2003, this time in the particular context of
domestic violence and the partial defences, resulting in the Law Commission’s 2004
report.67 In terms of diminished responsibility, the commission recommended that any
amendment to the definition should be suspended until such time as the government
should task the Law Commission with conducting a comprehensive review of the law of
murder, at which time partial defences could be considered from first principles.68
Thus, in its 2006 report on Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide,69 the Law Commission
proposed a restructuring of the offence of homicide by setting out a hierarchy of
categorised offences existing within the realm of homicide, reflecting the offences’ degree
of seriousness.70 There would be two degrees of murder, with the fixed penalty applying to
first degree murder only.71 Diminished responsibility would be retained as a partial defence
which would have the effect of reducing first degree murder to second degree murder if
pleaded successfully.72 In terms of the definition itself, the commission was of the view that
it required clarification and modernisation along the lines of current diagnostic practices.73
However, the idea of a “full panoply of restructuring”74 with regard to the law of
murder proved too much for the government and, once again, diminished responsibility was
utilised as a form of compromise by the legislature.75 In its 2008 consultation paper,76 the
government was in agreement with the commission’s proposed definition; however, it
diverged from the commission in terms of the scope of reform. The government was of
the view that the proposed changes to diminished responsibility should be implemented
within the existing structure pertaining to murder, notwithstanding that the commission’s
recommendations were made only in the context of its proposed homicide offence.77
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66 HC Debs, 27 November 1956, col. 318 (statement of the Attorney General). See Chalmers and Leverick,
Criminal Defences, n. 7 above, pp. 227–8.
67 Law Commission, Report on Partial Defences to Murder, No 195 (London: HMSO 2004).
68 It is only in the context of a full review that the commission proposed a definition of diminished
responsibility based on its prior consultation process. The commission’s proposal received much support from
academic commentators. For example, see “Editorial: adjusting the boundaries of murder: partial defences
and complicity” (2008) 11 Crim LR 829.
69 Law Commission, Murder, n. 44 above.
70 Ibid. para. 1.64.
71 Ibid. para. 1.67.
72 Ibid. para. 5.83.
73 Ibid. para. 5.107.
74 M Eagle (then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice), Coroners and Justice Bill, HC Public Bill
Committee Debs, 3 March 2009, col. 413.
75 However, the door is not entirely shut on reform – see discussion of reforms on a “staged basis” in Ministry
of Justice (MoJ), Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for reform of the law, summary of responses and
government position, responses to consultation (London: HMSO 2009), para. 120.
76 Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for reform of the law CP(R) 19/08 (July 2008). For discussion see
“Editorial”, n. 68 above.
77 MoJ, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, n. 75 above, para. 9.
Whether or not the government will further reform the law of murder any time soon is
a moot point. In any event, our focus for present purposes is upon the introduction of a
new definition of diminished responsibility under s. 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act
2009.78 Much can be said of the legislature’s choice of vehicle for redefining diminished
responsibility,79 suffice it to say that a more fitting course of action would have seen a
framework of reform dedicated to a complete re-evaluation of the law of murder.
Section 52 replaces the existing definition under s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 as
outlined above, with the following definition:
(1) A person (“D”) who kills or is a party to the killing of another is not to be
convicted of murder if D was suffering from an abnormality of mental
functioning which–
(a) arose from a recognised medical condition
(b) substantially impaired D’s ability to do one or more of the things
mentioned in subsection (1A), and
(c) provides an explanation for D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a
party to the killing.
(1A)Those things are–
(a) to understand the nature of D’s conduct;
(b) to form a rational judgment;
(c) to exercise self-control.
(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), an abnormality of mental functioning
provides an explanation for D’s conduct if it causes, or is a significant
contributory factor in causing, D to carry out that conduct.
Although certainly fulfilling the aims of clarity and modernisation in line with current
diagnostic practices with the introduction of terms like “mental functioning” and
“recognised medical condition”, the new definition is far from flawless.80 Its overall effect
on diminished responsibility in England and Wales and Northern Ireland81 is to curb the
scope of the doctrine to a considerable degree.
As discussed above, the 1957 definition of diminished responsibility facilitated a broad
interpretation of the doctrine by the courts. Indeed, the Law Commission describes its use
by legal and medical experts as a “benign conspiracy”82 in circumstances where the mental
condition of the offender was not strictly recognised as a mental disorder or medical
condition, such as the case of the mercy killer.83 The curtailment of the definition under
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78 The Act received Royal Assent on 12 November 2009. The commencement date was 4 October 2010
(Commencement No 4). Many provisions of the Act are applicable to Northern Ireland, with some also
applicable to the Scottish Executive.
79 The Act consists of seven parts in all, which address a miscellany of subject matters both inside and outside
the realm of criminal justice, for example, coroner law and practice, data sharing, legal aid and child
pornography offences. For a summary of the parts, see “Editorial: the Coroners and Justice Act 2009” (2010)
Crim LR 1, pp. 1–2. For discussion, see J Miles, “The Coroners and Justice Act 2009: a ‘dog’s breakfast’ of
Homicide Reform” (2009) 10 Arch News 6, p. 6.
80 For a detailed review of the wording, see R D Mackay, “The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 – partial defences
to murder (2) the new diminished responsibility plea” (2010) Crim LR 290.
81 S. 53 (persons suffering from diminished responsibility (Northern Ireland)) replaces s. 5 of the Criminal
Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1966.
82 Law Commission, Partial Defences, n. 67 above, para. 2.34.
83 See R D Mackay, “The diminished responsibility plea in operation – an empirical study”, in Law Commission,
Partial Defences, n. 67 above, Appendix B, where Mackay’s study of 157 cases in which diminished responsibility
was raised suggests that six were cases of mercy killing.
the new Act, to internationally recognised and documented medical conditions, may result
in such defendants being convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment,
notwithstanding that he or she may have been a “highly stressed killer”.84
It remains to be seen whether s. 52 will in practice have a detrimental bearing upon a
particular type of offender who would have been convicted of manslaughter rather than
murder under the 1957 definition of diminished responsibility. Furthermore, in the section
there is no link to the special verdict under the M’Naghten rules, and indeed the Law
Commission expressed concern that “there is a need to reconsider the relationship between
. . . diminished responsibility and insanity”.85
In terms of scope, the journey so far for the doctrine has oscillated from broad to
narrow and back again within the jurisdictions of Scotland, Northern Ireland and England
and Wales. It seems torn between analysis in the context of the mandatory life sentence for
murder, and its relationship with the insanity defence, with the result that its true aim or
nature is often left unmentioned, i.e. an acknowledgment of the frailty of human nature.
With this in mind, the next part examines the Irish experience of the doctrine.
1.5 DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY IN IRELAND
The closest resemblance to diminished responsibility in Irish law prior to the 2006 Act was
the Infanticide Act 1949, whereby the jury is entitled to return a verdict of infanticide, in
lieu of murder, the punishment for which is as for manslaughter.86 Indeed, the 2006 Act
amends the definition of infanticide87 and provides that a woman found guilty of the
offence may be dealt with in accordance with the diminished responsibility section.88
Throughout the twentieth century, a few attempts were made to recognise diminished
responsibility as forming part of the Irish common law, none of which were successful. The
origins of the possibility of a reduced sentence for a murder conviction based on the
presence of “mental abnormality” can be traced to the 1931 case of AG v O’Shea.89 Here,
the jury found the accused guilty and added a rider to its verdict recommending that special
consideration be given to the fact that the crime was unpremeditated and committed during
a period of mental abnormality. On appeal, however, it was held that the rider did not
contain anything which constituted a qualification of the crime of murder, and the verdict
was not modified.90
Of relevance also is the 1974 decision of Doyle v Wicklow County Council,91 wherein a
volitional insanity test was approved of which would question whether the accused was
debarred from refraining from committing the act because of a defect of reason due to
mental illness. The test was in addition to the M’Naghten rules under the ambit of insanity,
as opposed to existing as a form or element of diminished responsibility.
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86 S. 1, Infanticide Act 1949.
87 S. 22, Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006.
88 S. 6(3), Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006.
89 [1931] IR 728.
90 Ibid. (Kennedy CJ).
91 [1974] IR 55, approving The People (AG) v Hayes (Central Criminal Court, November, 1967) noted in 
R J O’Hanlon, “Not guilty because of insanity” (1968) 3 Irish Jurist 61. The test had previously been held as
not forming part of Irish law in (People) AG v Michael Manning [1955] 89 ILTR 155.
Diminished responsibility was more overtly canvassed by defence counsel in the 1985
case of DPP v Joseph O’Mahony.92 Here the accused was charged with murder and at trial the
defence argued that he was suffering from such abnormality of mind as substantially
impaired his mental responsibility for his acts as to entitle the jury to consider the alternative
of finding a verdict of manslaughter instead of murder.93 On appeal, it was argued that
there always had been a defence of diminished responsibility at common law and that it
should, if necessary, be expanded by the court so as to equate with the formula proposed
by the accused in light of modern psychiatric expertise. This argument involved necessarily
a suggestion that the Homicide Act of 1957 was declaratory only and not the introduction
of a new legal principle.94 However, Finlay CJ disagreed, adding that the Act was introduced
in order to liberalise the rigid M’Naghten rules.95
This decision put to an end the possibility of introducing diminished responsibility by
means of judicial activism96 and certainly impeded any progress that had been made on a
legislative basis by the Henchy Committee following its 1978 report.97 Indeed, despite that
committee’s recommendation, which included a draft Criminal Justice (Mental Illness) Bill
– introducing the doctrine together with a new insanity formula98 – no such legislation
was enacted.99
Eventually, the implementation of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 gave legal
standing to the partial defence of diminished responsibility in Irish law. Section 6
provides that:
(1) Where a person is tried for murder and the jury or, as the case may be, the
Special Criminal Court finds that the person–
(a) did the act alleged,
(b) was at the time suffering from a mental disorder, and
(c) the mental disorder was not such as to justify finding him or her not
guilty by reason of insanity, but was such as to diminish substantially his
or her responsibility for the act, the jury or court, as the case may be, shall
find the person not guilty of that offence but guilty of manslaughter on
the ground of diminished responsibility.
“Mental disorder” is defined so as to include “mental illness, mental disability, dementia
or any disease of the mind but does not include intoxication”.100
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95 Ibid. p. 522.
96 Boland, “Diminished responsibility”, n. 26 above. See also B Chubb, The Politics of the Irish Constitution (Dublin:
Institute of Public Administration 1991).
97 Third Interim Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Mentally Ill and Maladjusted Persons: The
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98 See 2.1.1 below for further discussion.
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situation. For example, In Re Ellis [1990] 2 IR 291, the Court of Criminal Appeal stated obiter that the
circumstances of the case: “[highlighted] the necessity for [Parliament] to examine as a matter of real urgency
whether legislation is now needed to define the nature and scope of the plea of insanity and, possibly, of
diminished responsibility, as a defence in criminal trials”, at 295.
100 S. 1, Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006.
In 2003, the Law Reform Commission stated that the scope of the doctrine in Ireland
is narrower than that of s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957, and is instead more similar to
the Scottish definition. It adds that in order to be in a position to bring a defence, the
accused would have to be suffering from a mental disorder “just short of insanity”. Thus,
for instance, it is likely that psychopathy does not fall within the scope of s. 6.101
Since the introduction of s. 6, the defence has been invoked in the Irish courts on
several occasions, four of them successfully.102 Though it is perhaps too early to tell what
will be its enduring effect, a theoretical and practical analysis at this time is useful, in that it
gives context to emerging judicial attitudes towards the law in question and the offenders
upon whom it impacts.
2 Present day analysis of the law in Ireland
2.1 THE NATURE OF DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY UNDER S. 6
A cross-jurisdictional, historical analysis of the doctrine reveals that there is no one
principle underlying the law relating to diminished responsibility. Instead, its nature appears
to juxtapose two core positions: firstly, as a partial defence which offsets the restrictive
nature of the insanity defence and facilitates degrees of criminal responsibility, rather than
an all-or-nothing approach; and, secondly, as a form of extenuating circumstance in murder
cases, necessitated by the existence of the mandatory life sentence for murder. This part
considers each position in turn, with reference to the Irish experience.
2.1.1 Compensating for the insanity defence
The draconian verdict of “guilty but insane” under the Trial of Lunatics Act 1883 was
replaced by s. 5 of the 2006 Act,103 which allows a special verdict of “not guilty by reason
of insanity” in the following circumstances:
(1)  (a) the accused person was suffering at the time from a mental disorder, and
(b) the mental disorder was such that the accused person ought not to be held
responsible for the act alleged by reason of the fact that he or she–
(i) did not know the nature and quality of the act, or
(ii) did not know that what he or she was doing was wrong, or
(iii) was unable to refrain from committing the act
The special verdict does little more than enshrine in legislation the Irish common law
position relating to the insanity defence. The first two parts retain the substance of the
M’Naghten rules, which do not amount to the sole or exclusive test for insanity in Ireland.
The third part reflects this by incorporating the volitional control test as set out in the
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103 S. 5, Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006. The Trial of Lunatics Act 1883 was repealed in full by s. 25 of the
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decision in Doyle. Thus, the Irish insanity defence extends its reach significantly beyond its
English counterpart and is more akin to the position in Northern Ireland.104
While the continued extension of the M’Naghten rules is welcomed, it should not be
assumed that an “irresistible impulse” type defence solves the M’Naghten conundrum.105 An
opportunity to re-evaluate this much criticised approach was not availed of by the legislature,
despite the proposed definition by the Henchy Committee which suggested simpler and
more flexible wording. The committee recommended that, where a person is suffering from
a mental disorder at the time of the act such that he or she should not be found guilty of the
offence, a verdict of “not guilty by reason of mental disorder” should apply.106
In any event, the Irish legislature constructed a position whereby the diminished
responsibility defence would be necessary in order to supplement a still unsatisfactory
insanity defence. Even at the Bill stage, the legislature alluded to potential problems with the
special verdict. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Criminal Law (Insanity) Bill 2002
states that the availability of the verdict of diminished responsibility:
should reduce the danger that a jury will return an insanity verdict when faced
with a person whom they regard as not being completely sane, even if he or she
does not meet the legal criteria for insanity.
This statement suggests that a major purpose of the 2006 Act was to appease a perceived
danger (or risk) that juries are returning insanity verdicts in respect of murder cases where
the accused has a mental disorder, but does not satisfy the legal criteria for insanity. It
contrasts markedly with the concerns of the Henchy Committee, to the effect that offenders
with mental disorders were being treated as “normal” people at sentencing.107
In any event, the statement can be undermined on a number of bases. Most obviously,
it is difficult to appreciate the source of the concern voiced by the government in light of
the secrecy surrounding jury deliberations. Furthermore, the number of insanity acquittals
in Ireland has declined markedly from the nineteenth century108 to the present day,109
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which suggests that either juries have not been over-zealous with their acquittals, or
defendants are slow to plead the special defence, or both.
The statement is further challenged by the apparent unpopularity of the insanity
defence in Ireland, as illustrated by DPP v Redmond.110 In this case, the accused purposefully
did not plead “not guilty by reason of insanity” on the basis that he would prefer to have a
definite sentence rather than a situation whereby he would be detained at the pleasure of
the government in the Central Mental Hospital under the Trial of Lunatics Act 1883.
Although a successful plea of insanity no longer results in automatic detention under the
2006 Act, uncertainty as to the consequences of such a verdict remains.
An additional point also raises questions about the accuracy of the government’s
statement. During the second-stage debate of the 2002 Bill, Senator Tony Kett highlighted
the fact that Central Criminal Court lawyers are critical of the narrow remit of the insanity
verdict because they find it difficult to convince a jury to return the special verdict on that
basis (citing the controversial Gallagher and O’Donnell cases)111 as they fear that the
individual may walk free. This implies that juries are less likely to acquit and more likely to
convict if they have doubts about the mental condition of an offender.112 More than this,
it suggests that both the senator’s view and the government’s statement are largely
conjecture and, while this may be forgiven in the context of a Seanad debate, it is less easy
to excuse in an Explanatory Memorandum.
The ease by which the government’s rationale for the introduction of the doctrine is
undermined suggests a further purpose to the law, which extends beyond any perceived
danger of juries acquitting in borderline insanity cases. It is suggested that a primary
function of diminished responsibility is to compensate for a rigid and largely unworkable
insanity law, and a reluctance on the part of the legislature to re-evaluate from first
principles the efficacy and relevance of a dwindling defence.113 This can be supported to
some degree by the fact that there is little evidence to suggest that the courts instruct the
jury on the issue of insanity in cases where diminished responsibility is raised,
notwithstanding that s. 6 requires that “the mental disorder was not such as to justify finding
him or her not guilty by reason of insanity”.114
Coonan and Foley argue that this procedure is too unwieldy as it technically seems to
require the trial judge when directing the jury on diminished responsibility to first direct it
on insanity and then, if it is satisfied that the insanity defence does not apply, to continue
to direct it on diminished responsibility. Both are based on the existence of the same
definition of mental disorder, while the insanity defence incorporates the M’Naghten rules
together with a volitional insanity wing, the diminished responsibility definition’s relation to
the special defence suggests that the same test can be applied, but in the context of a lesser
degree of responsibility.
Coonan and Foley highlight the unprecedented nature of this approach,115 yet some
logic can be garnered from the position if one considers the definitions put forward by the
Henchy Committee. Both draft sections required the accused to suffer from a mental
disorder at the time of the offence; the insanity defence such that the accused should not
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be found guilty; and the diminished responsibility defence not such as to find the accused
not guilty by reason of mental disorder, but such as to diminish substantially his or her
responsibility.116 Each definition is drafted with the other in mind, with a view to focusing
on levels of guilt, in a manner similar to Stephen.117 The ambiguity pertaining to the
relationship between the definitions under the 2006 Act may be due to the “cut and paste”
mentality of the legislature.
Though still in its infancy, the caselaw in this area to date appears to indicate that
diminished responsibility is not an issue in so-called “borderline” insanity cases, and that
they are not cases where the jury is likely to acquit. For example, two successful diminished
responsibility cases, O’Dwyer118 and Crowe,119 which were both based on “weak” mental
diagnoses, did not see the insanity defence entertained.120 Furthermore, in the case of
Seamus Fitzgerald,121 a defendant with a major psychiatric history was convicted of murder,
despite a number of psychiatrists testifying to the effect that the accused had an anti-social
personality disorder.122
2.1.2 Mitigating the mandatory life sentence for murder
The question under consideration is whether, in Ireland, mitigation of sentence in respect
of diminished responsibility is a mere procedural effect of a successful defence, or goes to
the nature of the doctrine itself. If it is a procedural effect in order to “get around” the
mandatory penalty in the context of murder, then the doctrine is a symptom of an arguably
outdated homicide structure with an ever-diminishing shelf-life.123 If, on the other hand,
the doctrine exists for a more fundamental purpose, it matters not as to the existence of the
mandatory penalty and diminished responsibility stands as a partial defence in its own right.
The evidence appears to be in favour of the former contention.
The government makes its position clear. The Explanatory Memorandum to the
Criminal Law (Insanity) Bill 2002 states that:
[t]he effect of [its application to murder only] will be that if diminished
responsibility is successfully pleaded, a conviction for manslaughter will be
recorded with the sentence, at the discretion of the court . . . [t]here is no need
to apply the concept in the case of other crimes where there is no mandatory
sentence.
Furthermore, the Law Commission of England and Wales has said that the concept of
a “partial defence” such as diminished responsibility is “something of a misnomer”, and a
means by which the law has facilitated discretion in sentencing in respect of murder
convictions.124 It adds that such an outcome could equally have been achieved by “making
proof of the exceptional mitigating circumstances relevant to whether the sentence for
murder was still mandatory, without affecting the verdict of murder”. Indeed, most
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commentators would argue that the very existence of the doctrine is dependent upon the
retention of the fixed penalty for murder, and that if the fixed penalty was abolished,
diminished responsibility could be dispensed with. For example, Dell has remarked that
diminished responsibility exists “only to provide a means of escape from the mandatory
penalty for murder” – a situation which she describes as a “fundamental anomaly”.125
However, Wasik126 maintains that it is a mistake to regard the fixed penalty and partial
excuse as causally dependent on each other; it is rather that both phenomena stem from a
third consideration, the fact that murder is marked as a “crime standing out from all
others”.127 Wasik’s view is based on the premise that murder is considered to be the most
serious of crimes, and it is perhaps appropriate that the punishment too is correspondingly
serious to reflect this.
This argument is an oversimplification of the situation. There exists in Ireland and
elsewhere strong support for the more realistic and humane contention that, just as with
manslaughter, there is considerable moral variability within the offence category of
murder.128 For example, Bacik has argued that the mandatory life sentence gives rise to
injustice as it does not reflect the varying degrees of culpability in the crime of murder.129
Some murders are more heinous than others and differing levels of heinousness should be
reflected in sentencing.130 Of course, this was also the view of the Law Commission of
England and Wales in its murder report.131
A second factor which undermines Wasik’s view is that most claims pertaining to murder
as a “crime apart from all others” are born from a sensationalist journalistic and political
culture. Murder is habitually depicted as a “charismatic” word in the vocabulary of popular
legal discourse, such that often anything less than the maximum penalty can result in a
torrent of criticism for the courts from the media and the political sphere.132 Blom-Cooper
and Morris allude to this when they describe politicians as “prisoners of orthodoxy” who
cause the stagnation of the resolution of the mandatory life debate due to their reluctance
to think “outside the box” for fear it would “spell some form of cataclysmic disaster” in
terms of public confidence.133 Such an attitude inhibits the introduction of important
criminal justice reform by reason of the superficial aim of appearing “tough on crime”.
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Thirdly, this attitude may be criticised on the basis of the constitutional principle of
proportionality.134 The caselaw in this area, in particular, raises questions about the fairness
of mandatory sentencing in light of the centrality of the proportionality principle.135 As
O’Malley observes, a mandatory sentence essentially prevents the courts from fulfilling their
constitutional obligation to impose a proportionate sentence.136
The above arguments support the contention that a key purpose of the introduction of
the doctrine in Ireland is to offset the harsh effect of the mandatory life sentence for
murder, while evading the need to deal with its abolition. Although the abolition of the
mandatory life sentence would obviate the need for the defence of diminished
responsibility, this is unlikely to happen anytime soon due to a number of factors, most
notably the novelty of the doctrine in Irish law and political inertia in relation to the
mandatory sentence.
2.2 A NOTE ON JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF S. 6
Two key questions go to the heart of the interpretation of diminished responsibility in
practice: firstly, the notion of what amounts to a mental disorder for the purposes of s. 6;
and, secondly, the question of causation, that is, does the mental disorder have to be the
primary or the sole cause of the offender’s diminished responsibility, or is a significant cause
sufficient? This section briefly considers each in turn in light of the new caselaw in this area.
Most cases have dealt with the issue of diminished responsibility by relying on psychiatric
evidence in an uncontroversial manner. The case of DPP v John Collins,137 however, is of
particular interest in this regard, as during the trial two experts clashed on the fundamental
issue of the definition of mental disorder: they could not agree on whether the ICD 10138
definition or the DSM IV139 definition should be followed.140 Alexander summarises the
problem relating to psychiatric definition within the courtroom when she says:
experts are free to interpret these legal terms in light of their professional beliefs.
Without guidance . . . there is a lack of uniformity and predictability in the
application of these terms . . . this encourages unseemly battles of experts in
court, [and] inconsistency of findings between judges.141
This suggests that the discrepancy in expert findings may be a factor which feeds the
inconsistency which is evident at the sentencing stage of cases involving convictions of
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility, but this issue will be considered
further in the next section.
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In terms of the extent to which the mental disorder must diminish the responsibility of
the accused in order to bring a successful defence, the case of O’Dwyer142 is instructive. The
accused brutally killed his teenaged sister in motiveless circumstances, following an evening
spent watching television together. The psychiatric experts for the defence were successful
in arguing that the accused was suffering from temporal lobe epilepsy and depersonalisation
disorder, the latter condition, according to one expert,143 being under-recognised by the
professional psychiatric community.144 The prosecution pointed to several other factors
apart from the mental disorder which may have provided an explanation, or been the cause
(in whole or in part) of the actions of the accused. It was the prosecution’s contention that
the accused was suffering from a severe alcohol problem, but nonetheless knew what he
was doing at the time of the killing.145 The prosecution’s expert, Dr Kennedy, undermined
the defence expert’s diagnosis of depersonalisation disorder and said that it was an attempt
to find an explanation for the tragic outcome of the offence. He further added that even if
he was wrong and the accused did suffer from depersonalisation disorder, he did not see its
relation to the offence in question, the more likely reason for the killing being that the
accused was overcome with “profound feelings of shame and embarrassment” having been
extremely drunk that weekend.146
The jury accepted that the accused was suffering from a condition amounting to a
mental disorder, which substantially diminished his responsibility for the killing. However,
it is difficult to say with certainty that the depersonalisation disorder did substantially
diminish the accused’s responsibility for the act. Given strong prosecution evidence, it may
be that the accused had his charge reduced to manslaughter not alone due to the defence
psychiatrist’s diagnosis, but perhaps also due to his individual circumstances, or the “tragic
outcome” of the case. This underlying sense of humanity over strict legal principle is
reminiscent of the early origins of the diminished responsibility doctrine which emerged
from the Scottish jurisdiction.147
Considering the various elements at play in this case, it would appear that the mental
disorder must essentially amount to a significant contributory factor in causing the
diminishment in responsibility, as opposed to the sole factor. This would be in line with s. 52
of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 as discussed above in the context of England and
Wales and Northern Ireland. This provides that, not only must mental disorder substantially
impair the accused’s ability to understand the nature of his or her conduct, to form a
rational judgment or to exercise self-control, but it must also provide an explanation for the
act, in that it must either cause or be a significant contributory factor in causing the
defendant to carry out the killing.148 It will be interesting to see what future cases may bring
to the interpretation of the definition under Irish law as this body of law develops.
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2.3 CONSEQUENCES OF A S. 6 VERDICT
The result of a diminished responsibility verdict is that the general law concerning
manslaughter applies, in that the court may apply any sentence up to a maximum of life
imprisonment and/or a fine.149 Needless to say, sentencing for manslaughter resulting from
a successful diminished responsibility defence is highly discretionary, as it should be, but its
effectiveness depends on the range of suitable dispositions available to the courts150 which
are somewhat lacking in the Irish criminal justice system.151 It is unfortunate that the
opportunity was not seized by the legislature to ameliorate this position with the
implementation of the 2006 Act.
Post-2006, the O’Dwyer case demonstrates the dearth of options available when
sentencing the mentally disordered offender and the resultant frustration of the court. At
the sentencing hearing, Carney J stated that he had to examine similar cases in England and
Wales for guidance where he said that the law relating to sentencing in diminished
responsibility cases was more “sophisticated” than its Irish counterpart, the expression of
which he labelled as “crude” in that it boiled down to a question of imprisonment (there
being no alternatives such as a hospital order available).152 O’Dwyer was sentenced to six
years’ imprisonment. Counsel for the DPP informed the sentencing judge that, were it not
for the defence of diminished responsibility, the DPP would consider the killing on the “top
end” of the range of manslaughter cases, and that it was for the sentencing judge to assess
the degree to which the defence brought the offence down the scales of the hierarchy of
manslaughter cases.153
In Crowe, the DPP accepted the accused’s plea of not guilty to murder but guilty of
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility, despite arguably “weak”
evidence of mental disorder.154 At trial, the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.
The accused appealed against the severity of the sentence and the Court of Criminal
Appeal found that the appropriate sentence was 20 years. Understandably, the significant
alcohol and drug problems of the accused,155 together with his 23 previous convictions,
would have weighed heavily on the mind of the trial judge – perhaps to the extent that he
dismissed the psychiatric evidence altogether. Indeed, the Court of Criminal Appeal held
the view that the sentencing judge did not even take into account the plea of guilty to
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manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility, which had been accepted by the
DPP, when imposing the life sentence.156
The difficulty for the appeal court lay in the fact that the trial judge had rejected the very
basis upon which the DPP had accepted a plea of manslaughter by reason of diminished
responsibility due to mental disorder.157 As in O’Dwyer, the appeal court too was left
without an answer when it asked counsel for the DPP whether he felt that the case was at
the upper end of the scale of manslaughter. In the opinion of the court, a plea to
manslaughter simpliciter would certainly have permitted the trial judge to impose the
maximum sentence of life imprisonment notwithstanding the plea of guilty. It went on to
hold, however, that:
implicit in the acceptance of a plea to manslaughter by reason of diminished
responsibility due to mental disorder is the recognition that the applicant can not
and should not be treated in precisely the same manner as a person fully
responsible for his own actions. It would be utterly destructive of s. 6 of the
Criminal Law Insanity Act, 2006, to hold otherwise.158
Kearns J concluded that at the very least, the applicant should expect to receive a
sentence “short of life imprisonment” (emphasis added), due to the “associated stigma”
attached to a life sentence.159
Inconsistency in the sentencing of individuals found guilty of manslaughter on the
grounds of diminished responsibility is also evident when one considers the judgment in
DPP v Egan,160 where the accused was given a sentence of life imprisonment without
recourse to the fact that the diminished responsibility element should normally act to
shorten the sentence, as stated by Kearns J (above).161 The accused, who suffered from
schizo-affective disorder, was found guilty of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished
responsibility for beating to death his cellmate in Mountjoy Prison. He carried out the attack
in a holding cell which the two men were sharing with five other prisoners.162 Evidence was
tendered that the accused had been transferred to the prison from the Central Mental
Hospital just days before the attack without the anti-psychotic medication prescribed to him
to manage his condition.163
The prosecution and the defence both urged the jury to find the accused not guilty of
murder but guilty of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility in light of his
mental disorder. Although the defence was successful, the accused was nonetheless
sentenced to life imprisonment.164 In imposing the sentence, the judge indicated that it was
“best calculated to protect the public”.165 The accused has since failed in his attempt to
overturn his sentence.166
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 62(3)
156 See n. 102 above, at 230–1.
157 This action would have amounted to a sentencing error in England and Wales, see R v Lawrence (1981) 3 Cr
App R (S) 49.
158 See n. 102 above, p. 234.
159 Ibid.
160 (21 April 2009, unreported), Central Criminal Court.
161 See, n. 102 above, at 234.
162 In response to the appalling circumstances of the case, the government has appointed a commission (headed
by barrister Grainne McMorrow) to investigate the killing and examine the management of prisoners with
mental disorders.
163 “Prisoner acquitted of murdering cell mate”, Irish Times, Dublin, 22 April 2009.
164 Sentence was imposed on 29 June 2009, Central Criminal Court.
165 “Prisoner gets life sentence for killing cellmate”, Irish Times, Dublin, 30 June 2009.
166 “Man who killed cellmate fails to have sentence overturned”, Irish Times, Dublin, 30 October 2010.
288
Although intrinsically inconsistent, the early caselaw is still of value in terms of
assessing the level of punishment to be applied by the courts within the manslaughter scale
at this time. It also goes toward highlighting the gross inadequacy of the options available
to the sentencing judge under the 2006 Act and in Irish sentencing law generally;167 options
which neither recognise the special nature of such offences, nor take into account the
particular needs of the offender with a mental disorder.
Conclusion
Diminished responsibility is an unusual legal animal. It has become a necessity in the
jurisdictions discussed in this paper, due in the most part to the inability of legislatures to
provide the radical reforms required both in respect of the insanity defence and of murder
law.168 And while the introduction of the doctrine into Irish law is a welcome development
in that it stays true to its principle of acknowledging the frailty of the human condition, its
manifestation in s. 6, while tipping the scales towards flexibility, is flawed both in terms of
its language and effect.
When introducing the 2006 Act, the legislature gave much weight to the fear that juries
might be utilising the special verdict to acquit individuals with mental disorders in cases
which amount to “borderline” insanity.169 This is undermined by the fact that there has
been a decrease in the raising of the insanity defence in Ireland since the nineteenth century.
Furthermore, we have seen how, in the cases since 2006, there is little evidence to suggest
that the courts instruct the jury on the issue of insanity in circumstances where diminished
responsibility is raised, despite the fact that s. 6 appears to indicate that for a jury to proceed
to consider a diminished responsibility defence, it must have found that the accused is not
legally insane.170 Thus, it would appear that in terms of insanity, the diminished
responsibility defence is merely acting to compensate for a largely unworkable and archaic
special defence.171
That the diminished responsibility defence was introduced essentially to offset the
harshness of the insanity defence and the mandatory life sentence for murder respectively
is not, in itself, unhelpful. Indeed, it is welcome if it results in improved provision (no
matter how minimal) for defendants with mental disorders within the criminal justice
system. The problem, rather, is that diminished responsibility merely patches over deeper
problems pertaining to this area of law (most notably, the inadequacy of the insanity
defence and the continued existence of the mandatory life sentence); and also impedes any
possibility of a much needed re-evaluation from first principles of the position of
individuals with mental disorders within the criminal justice regime. But that is a subject
matter for another time and place.
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